From Flu Wiki 2

Forum: Centers for Disease Control 2

02 August 2006

anon_22 – at 16:26

part 1 here

moeb – at 16:30

where’d you go… (chuckles) so where were we.. this study chose the “most likely” ways H5N1 might or has reassorted. Wouldn’t you agree that ten years of no pandemic backs this approach?

moeb – at 16:35

if someone smacks you with a wet scaly slightly slimy thing and says it’s a fish.. it’s probably a fish.

We’ve all been wondering why H5N1 didn’t mix with human flu and do it’s deadly deed. All these years of mixing with human’s and chickens and farms and tight spaces in east asia…

cook the fish and ponder this

anon_22 – at 16:47

moeb – at 16:30 “where’d you go… (chuckles)

:-)

so where were we.. this study chose the “most likely” ways H5N1 might or has reassorted. Wouldn’t you agree that ten years of no pandemic backs this approach?

Nope.

The best evidence is to look at what has been really happening.

Check out this paper on how H5N1 is continuing to reassort in southern China and producing strains that are increasingly virulent to mammals.

analyst4mkts – at 16:52

anon_22 – at 15:39

“What is intriguing (and, if my suspicion that this is nothing more than a headline grabbing exercise on a day that the FAO/OIE sequence-release decision comes out is correct, what p***es me off) is the way that this was presented”

Would your suspicions include the possibility that this “breakthrough” was timed to reduce pressure on CDC to release sequences?

note: I am way out of my water here and greatly appreciate the exchanges between the more learned members of the science community that are here at FW.

anon_22 – at 16:56

analyst4mkt,

You guess is in the same direction as mine.

moeb – at 17:03

I find it highly speculative at the very least… the idea that H5N1 passed into humans mutated to get nasty (?) and then went back into birds to cook a bit more. And of course as the report says.. there really isn’t anything but theory/more speculation as to H5N1 being mixed further in pigs

now as to re assortment of avian flu with other avian flu.. that seems entirely feasible and as you say, proven. So what’s this got to do with transmissionability and this study? If I read you correctly you hold that H5N1 (already highly viral), somehow re-assorted and became lethal to mice. Mmmm I shouldn’t have to ask but the 97 strain is lethal to mammals as far as I know. I suppose you can tell me of H5N1 strains prior to 97 that were not lethal to mammals?

anyway we’re about transmissionability here I think… you’ve got me confused

anon_22 – at 17:07

All I am saying is that the CDC study does not give us sufficient reason to think reassortment is not a likely way for a pandemic virus to arise.

moeb – at 17:08

I blink and think “why not”

anon_22 – at 17:11

Is that a question? :-)

moeb – at 17:14

I was going to suggest a long discussion over margaritas on a beach with a bonfire. However I really don’t understand why you feel the way you do. Of course I’m a layman (hears snickers in the background)

moeb – at 17:17

I stopped by to read the thread about the mammal reservoirs and discovered I had forgotten everything I learned earlier about doing “blasts” so be gentle

moeb – at 17:20

suppose we look at that last serious cluster in Indonesia. H5N1 had 22 minor mutations in that last transmission. I think we all sense that it was a hair away from going pandemic. and not via re assortment. so IF ←-- stressing that, re assortment doesn’t play a major part in the picture, were we wrong in this assumption that the last cluster was so close to being pandemic?

anon_22 – at 17:22

OK, just to clarify, in case there are others who are confused as well.

The CDC study used laboratory generated reassortants. Just as not all H5N1 are pathogenic, and not all Americans have green eyes, not all reassortants are the same.

We do not know the exact mechanims and conditions that trigger a reassortment event in nature. It is possible, even likely, that there are specific virus/host/environmental interactions that are important triggers, and it is also possible that certain genetic preconditions, ie prior mutations, make such subsequent reassortment more likely.

We DO know that whatever mechanism nature requires does not involve plasmids and CDC staff wearing PPE fiddling around in the lab. :-)

So just because a few reassortants generated in these highly artificial environments do not become easily transmitted between ferrets, again in laboratory conditions, does not mean that reassortment in nature to produce strains easily transmissible between humans is less likely.

moeb – at 17:22

tries to seem innocent

moeb – at 17:25

ahem… and NATURE used a mixed variety reassortments over ten years (well more like three) and gave us what?

moeb – at 17:27

how can you discount laboratory experiments conducted by serious dedicated individuals using the most likely means of mimicking nature (stretches abit with that but go with it for the moment) for…. natures unknown and thankfully late, reply

moeb – at 17:32
 a few of your most likely reassortments, you mean. under sanitary conditions with a host animal that is so similar to humans in how we react to H5N1, it’s scary and came up with the same results that natures been giving us
moeb – at 17:34
 does not write the various thoughts that goes through his mind about smart women, thus saving us all the irony
anon_22 – at 17:37

“moeb ¨C at 17:14 I was going to suggest a long discussion over margaritas on a beach with a bonfire.”

Sounds good to me. LOL

OK, so the Karo cluster.

moeb ¨C at 17:20 “suppose we look at that last serious cluster in Indonesia. H5N1 had 22 minor mutations in that last transmission. I think we all sense that it was a hair away from going pandemic. and not via re assortment. so IF ¡û--- stressing that, re assortment doesn¡¯t play a major part in the picture, were we wrong in this assumption that the last cluster was so close to being pandemic?

The answer to the last question IMO is no. We were right in being concerned simply because of the cluster size, ie H5N1 was showing an increasing ability to go H2H.

But while it was happening in realtime, there was one significant piece of information that we did not have till afterwards, and that is the fact that all the patients were blood relatives.

The presence of 22 mutations of the last case, while interesting, does not in itself indicate that a pandemic was possibly close (THAT was indicated by the size of the cluster). The reason why I say this is because the presence of mutations does not indicate anything other than the virus’s ability to mutate. To the extent that its actual transmission was limited to those who were related genetically, AND after acquiring those 22 mutations, the h2h transmission stopped, then those 22 mutations were most likely responsible for stopping and not increasing transmissibility which would have been required for a pandemic to develop.

So the Karo cluster was interesting in many ways, including causing confusion for the unwary.

Now there is at least a theoretical risk from the aftermath of that cluster. To the extent that the viru was able to go through h2h2h, it had acquired certain characteristics favoring its survival in humans. Whatever the original avian source for the index case was, since there was no culling, the source is still there.

And the poultry and/or even pigs from the neighbourhood could have re-acquired the virus from one of the patients, and that strain (especially the one that infected the son) is now circulating in the poultry, posing a severe risk of the next h2h2h2h.

Which, God forbid, may be happening as we speak.

moeb – at 17:40

could have re-aquired the virus from one of the patients? I’ve not read about a strain based on that cluster circulating in poultry there?

but thank you for answering on that one (and I thought you were off bobbling threads)

anon_22 – at 17:43

“ I’ve not read about a strain based on that cluster circulating in poultry there?”

Of course you haven’t. There are almost no avian samples from Indonesia.

moeb – at 17:47

that is not an answer

anon_22 – at 17:48

?

moeb – at 17:49

ahem, either there are cluster related strains circulating or there aren’t, teasing me with Indonesia’s supposed cover up is cruel. Look down yer bodice and find the notes about who says what (smile)

moeb – at 17:52

in other words, how do you know there are strains of KILLER OF 8 CLUSTER related H5N1 circulating in poultry in Karo?

I’ve gotta learn that bold text thing in here

anon_22 – at 17:52

Well, as Dem would say, no data means no data.

We don’t know if the cluster-related virus is still circulating.

But there was no culling.

And if I remember correctly, there was lots of patients running away from hospital etc plus everyone getting sick while still tripping over chickens running around, maybe, before they went to hospital.

So THAT virus is still out there, IMO.

moeb – at 17:58

going back to the CDC test of re assortment. I’m thinking, I’m the scientists.. I’m going to do this test. I’m going to find out how easy it is for H5N1 to re assort with human flu and become highly transmissionable. it’s an important experiment and I’m going to be scrutinized no matter how it turns out. so I’m stringent in the model I set up and the variables I use….. to my surprise and delight I find H5N1 doesn’t go pandemic by this means… after conferring with my bosses we decide the world should know this now…

examines my fingernails

moeb – at 18:02

what! double blinks, I really thought you said that the cluster mutated variety (as in already through to that mutated version in the son) was circulating in chickens? and I suppose it’s probable that the H5N1 that started the cluster is still out there circulating… we both know the actual infection source was never found. And if it were the same strain that is now infecting the two small clusters in Karo it’s unlikely there is a relation by blood to the cluster of 8

steals back the margarita

anon_22 – at 18:05

that’s ok, I’m more of a MaiTai kind of person.

moeb – at 18:07

anyway… I’ll follow your thoughts as they develop

Scaredy Cat – at 18:51

Leo7 @ 22:58 on Aug 31 - “Can’t wait to read nimans posts on the subject or Tom DVM.”

Leo7,

In case you missed it, on July 28 pogge declared niman permanently banned from Flu Wiki.

Melanie – at 19:08

Niman has his own website. You can read him there.

Tom DVM – at 19:29

Hi Scaredy Cat. I don’t know if you read effect measure but most of Dr. Niman’s posts, the type that you would see here, are on effect measure with as Melanie said the information on his own website.

The most common sense approach would be for Dr. Niman to make his website interactive and then if one chose to, they could discuss things directly with him on his own site where he rightly sets all the rules…including banning posters he, for whatever reason, he did not like.

I understand that you are not happy with the decision…be angry but don’t leave /:0)

bugladyJ— – at 19:38

Don’t know where this fits, so here goes: Three things to start practicing sooner than later:

1. Birthday cakes & candles: Do not eat cake after someone has blown out candles from that cake. (Prepare separate small cake/cupcake for the birthday person with candles & let theat person eat the contaminated cake instead of everyone) 2. Keep hands away from eyes, nose, mouth unless just washed. Use clean tissue to wipe eyes & discard after use. 3. Shake hands if need-be, but wash those hands before eating or touching face, etc.!

moeb – at 20:24

I was at a young girls birthday party once. the parents had put some of those candles that don’t blow out on the cake. a lot of spit went on that cake as the kids joined in blowing the candles. oogggy!

anon_22 – at 20:58

moeb,

I just started a new thread on the possibility that the current outbreak in Karo might be a continuation of the one in May.

Melanie – at 21:00

anon_22,

That’s chilling.

Scaredy Cat – at 21:21

Tom DVM at 19:29,

I know we don’t see eye to eye about Niman, but don’t you think there’s been a chilling effect on Flu Wiki dialogue since he’s been banned?

anon_22 – at 21:27

Scaredy Cat,

Please stay on topic.

Consider yourself warned.

Scaredy Cat – at 22:48

Consider myself warned? Is that a banning threat? Please be more clear. When you banned niman, you did not give clear warning, which left an ugly impression of unfairness.

ANON-YYZ – at 22:56

Scaredy Cat – at 18:51 Scaredy Cat – at 21:21 Scaredy Cat – at 22:48

So far, you have not shown any interest in this thread. You have only been promoting Niman. You are clearly off topic, warning or not.

Please give us some peace. We got good discussions going on here.

Thank you.

Tom DVM – at 23:54

Scaredy Cat. It would not be a good thing if we agreed on everything…and you are right, we do not agree on Dr. Niiman.

That said, I have a great deal of respect for your intellect and I do not believe Dr. Niman would raise a fuss if you were banned.

Dr. Niman seems to be carrying on as usual…I think we should as well.

03 August 2006

ANON-YYZ – at 01:38

moeb – at 17:58

“going back to the CDC test of re assortment. I’m thinking, I’m the scientists.. I’m going to do this test. I’m going to find out how easy it is for H5N1 to re assort with human flu and become highly transmissionable. it’s an important experiment and I’m going to be scrutinized no matter how it turns out. so I’m stringent in the model I set up and the variables I use….. to my surprise and delight I find H5N1 doesn’t go pandemic by this means… after conferring with my bosses we decide the world should know this now…

examines my fingernails “


The answer is in Dr. Woodson’s post:

“So, these results are completely expected and unsurprising. They don’t tell us anything new. If they had used a current H5N1 strain and reverse engineered that with the H3N1 hemagglutinin gene that contained the receptor for the mammalian upper respiratory tract, then this would have been really interesting. The reassortant resulting from that mix would almost certainly be transmissible and what would have been of interest would be to see what the case fatality rate was in the ferrets infected and then how effective Tamiflu treatment was in managing those infected”

02 August 2006 The Doctor – at 15:00

http://tinyurl.com/mj76n


to which I added my comments:

ANON-YYZ – at 15:52 anon_22 – at 15:39

It certainly was staged to look like a major news event, with blackout till Sunday at 5 p.m. etc to make sure it gets into the Monday newspapers.

The verbal disclaimer was a CYA.

“I did say we were a long way from being out of the woods. It’s the press that’s clueless.”

As I said before, CDC should make high profile announcement to warn the public that the headlines turned out to be misleading


Regardless of CDC’s original intent, which we may never know, would you agree the outcome is the mainstream media ended-up reporting misleading headlines?

Further, do you agree that CDC has a responsibility to ensure the public does not get the wrong perception from this news event, and therefore a CDC clarification is in order - given that Julie Gutenberg said “we are not out of the woods yet” and that important warning message got hidden in the fine print?

anonymous – at 04:12

I found the article here, but it requires subscription. As I remember, bird-flu articles were to be made accessable for free ? Or is it only for some special journals ? I think “Science”, “Nature” are doing this, which else ?

Bottomline – at 04:28

So when people say to me “the NYT said there wont be a pandemic” whats a good simple answer for them?

anonymous – at 04:29

suppose, they had found a reassortant strain which could transmit easily. Do you think, they would have told us ??? Maybe they even found such a reassortant, but did cut that portion of the study. Maybe they even deliberately made some mistakes with that strain, so they could justify that it wasn’t included in the data.

anon_22 – at 04:39

anonymous – at 04:29 “suppose, they had found a reassortant strain which could transmit easily. Do you think, they would have told us ??? Maybe they even found such a reassortant, but did cut that portion of the study. Maybe they even deliberately made some mistakes with that strain, so they could justify that it wasn’t included in the data.

Well, anything is possible. However, I suspect that anyone who finds anything like that would have a big stake in publishing and getting famous. Plus this kind of work is never done by one person, it would be very hard to get everyone to cover up on something so exciting.

anonymous – at 04:46

The Doctor writes, that they didn’t use HA and NA from H3N1 (H3N2?) but niman writes at recombinomics:


an H3N2 reassortant virus with avian virus internal protein genes exhibited efficient replication but inefficient transmission, whereas H5N1 reassortant viruses with four or six human virus internal protein genes exhibited reduced replication and no transmission


I think, they should have taken H2 from the 1958 pandemic and recombined it with the other H5N1-genes. H2 looks most similar to H5 and also H5 first showed up in 1959 shortly after the H2N2 pandemic.

anonymous – at 04:55

anon_22, it’s declared a military secret of natinal security importance. That has already happened with other flu-research. I think, the largest flu-database is at Los-Alamos database and Los Alamos is military research and national security. And e.g. Taubenberger works for the military (AFAIK).

anonymous – at 05:07

if they had found evidence for a panflu-strain, do you think they could have published that article without the national security people -at least- heavily debating the release ? We already know that panflu is an issue of “national security” (=military). Even if we would consider this military secrecy appropriate and good, is does reduce credibility of such civil panflu-research. Even if they don’t hide anything - the authors can’t prove it and this sort of experiments are difficult to reproduce. This branch of research just suffers from the secrecy-threat.

anon_22 – at 05:19

Anytime we’re getting several anonymous posts on one thread, I’m going to ask all the anonymous(es) to get yourself a handle (or name).

It’s for the sanity of the rest of the folks trying to understand what is being discussed.

anon_22 – at 05:21

anonymous – at 04:46

I think, they should have taken H2 from the 1958 pandemic and recombined it with the other H5N1-genes. H2 looks most similar to H5 and also H5 first showed up in 1959 shortly after the H2N2 pandemic.

I think their intention was try to find out if H5N1 will recombine with current human strains in circulation and the consequences of that.

anonymous – at 05:27

And anytime I see this, I’ll address the absurdity of that argument. (although it’s off topic, but you started) What exactly would become more understandable here, if a handle had been used ? And a handle can be changed within a thread or day or month or year. The real reason must be something else.

anon_22 – at 05:29

anonymous – at 05:07

if they had found evidence for a panflu-strain, do you think they could have published that article without the national security people -at least- heavily debating the release ? We already know that panflu is an issue of “national security” (=military). Even if we would consider this military secrecy appropriate and good, is does reduce credibility of such civil panflu-research. Even if they don’t hide anything - the authors can’t prove it and this sort of experiments are difficult to reproduce. This branch of research just suffers from the secrecy-threat.

Anything is possible.

It’s not useful to go too far into conspiracy theorist mode, IMO.

There’s a lot to learn from existing known information, and most of us are a long way from mastering that, let along what is unknown and probably unknowable.

anon_22 – at 05:34

“What exactly would become more understandable here, if a handle had been used?”

If there are 3 consecutive anonymous posts, how are people supposed to know whether the 2nd or 3rd are answering the first, or they are unrelated, or it’s all just one person talking and answering his own question?

Most people, myself included, would be more inclined to ignore your posts and not respond since it always takes longer time just to sort that out.

anonymous – at 05:50

05:21 , H2-sequences became rare the last years. Only H5*+H2* which I found was in mallards at Chany Lake. Double infections H3N2+H5N1 look unlikely too, because birds rarely catch H3N2 and humans rarely catch H5N1. We had reassortment recently H5N1+H5N1 in India and H5N1+H9N2 in Israel. H5N1+H1N1 is also an option.

anonymous – at 06:00

05:34, those 3 posts don’t depend on each other. Replies can still be marked as such, even by anonymice. I’d prefer if people here were reading posts more for content and less for entertainment. When it’s important who said what, then I’d prefer being ignored here. Posting as anonymous serves also as a filter, to filter out personal replies. (about your cats,vacation etc.)

anonymous – at 06:13

would you expect someone publishing an article like this : “reassort those {…) genes from H5N1-strain A/(…) and those (…) genes from H3N2-strain A/(…) and you’ll get a virus with pandemic potential, able to kill hundredth of millions of people “ ?


Looks like publishing the recipe how to make a new especially deadly new explosive or chemical or bacterium or virus. So the study was doomed to produce negative result.

anon_22 – at 06:42

anonymous – at 06:00 “05:34, those 3 posts don’t depend on each other.”

One would have to go back and read that again to figure that out.

I am making a request. You don’t have to do what I request.

However, I’m also trying my best to answer questions or respond. And my time is limited. I’m just telling you what it’s like from this end trying to figure things out by scanning posts.

I’m not there yet, but there may come a day when I will stop responding to anonymous posts.

Just speaking for myself.

Scaredy Cat – at 11:50

ANON YYZ at 22:56 - “So far, you have not shown any interest in this thread. You have only been promoting Niman. You are clearly off topic, warning or not.”

First, I have shown interest in this thread by reading it and responding informatively to a comment by Leo7 in which he was anticipating reading what Niman had to say. Anything else I have said has only been in response to others’ comments.

Second, I am not promoting Niman. For some strange reason, some people seem to think that if one wants to hear what Niman has to say—and what others have to say about what Niman has to say—that means they are “promoting” Niman.

That’s ridiculous.

If I am promoting anything it is as broad a discussion as possible. I am interested in what a lot of people here have to say, and I found threads that Niman participated in to be some of the most stimulating and informative.

And finally, I have been no more off topic than many others here. Exhibit A:

anon_22 - at 18:05:

that’s ok, I’m more of a MaiTai kind of person.

Scaredy Cat – at 11:57

Tom DVM at 23:54 - I do not believe Dr. Niman would raise a fuss if you were banned.

Tom,

Maybe it’s just my nature, and maybe I’m just really foolish, but in my life I have raised a fuss on behalf of a lot of people who have never returned the favor.

DemFromCTat 13:40

Enough, SC. You made your point, more than once.

As to the anonymous piece, we will be moving to registration, not for sinister motives (who has time for sinister motives) but because either the software requires it, or because anonymous conversations for the reasons anon_22 stated, are not helpful.

Just because you know who you are (and are not the next anonymous) doesn’t mean the rest of us do. Show some consideration to your fellow posters and pick a handle for the thread, and stick with it for the same thread.

NJ. Preppie – at 13:49

To go back to earlier comments that we are not happy with good news about the CDC reports: I believe journalists are inaccurate when they try to make headlines about science experiments. They are generalists and have to deal with many topics everyday. These experiments are about reassortment with a human H3N2 but we are not as concerned about a 1957 or 1968 type of reassortment pandemic, but a worse sort of species jump. There were previous positive claims made when Taubenberger published a paper about his experiments switching H1 and H3 receptor sites with H5. The media claimed that H5 was not able to switch to a2–6 receptors. However, what the report really meant was lab experiments could not switch virus receptors whole segments, and have the transmission work. There was a more complicated RNA combination in all the segments, that must be needed. That doesn’t mean nature can’t do it. Afterall, there are still avian H1N1 in wild birds, that can not infect humans, but one substrain 90 years ago did.

Taubenberger sequenced a 1917 H1N1 virus from a preserved Brant goose and found it was closely related to a modern avian H1N1, showing that there has been little genetic drift in 85 years. Avian H1N1 today shows sequence similarities to the 1917 Brant goose in the range of 88%−99%. The 1918 pandemic virus shares only 74%−77% similar identity with all the avian H1N1s. The modern H1N1 is more similar to the 1917 Brant goose than the 1918 pandemic virus. How did the virus mutate that much and in what host?

   It looks to have evolved mammalian adaptations over time from the avian H1. The pig lineage appears to descend from the same pandemic virus, and pigs did suffer the pandemic concurrently with people, in 1918–1919. A new avian H1N1 became established in European swine 20 years ago and is slowly adapting to mammals. So far 17 amino acid differences have been found in 20 years, 5 of which are in the antigenic sites. In contrast, the 1918 H1N1 has 28 amino acid differences. It’s like watching the 1918 pandemic virus reinvent itself. Should we be concerned about that? There are other possibilities too. In 1992, a human /avian reassortment virus, H1N2, was isolated in the UK, and is gaining ground. Recently, in the US, a triple reassortment, is circulating, combined from classical swine H1N1, human H3N2, and avian virus subtype. Also H9N2 is moderately prevalent in swine in east China.

Which adds up to, given the history of influenza adaptability, how responsible is it for the media to down play any pandemic danger? Something will eventually be happening and people need to realize the possibility, not the reverse. This article- Deadly Bird Flu Virus Not as Scary as You Think, reports that ferrets can’t sneeze with H5 outer proteins, as if that is celebratory news. We already know that ferrets don’t sneeze with regular H5N1, but they are “Dead as Doornails” and so is a large percentage of humans with the infection. These lab experiments with reassortments, help to untangle the mystery of viruses, (which has a long way to go) but are not producing reasons to be less concerned about it.

moeb – at 14:08

Anon XYZ Dr. Woodson seemed to miss that they did investigate a current H5N1 strain and reverse engineered that with the H3N1 hemagglutinin gene…. I would direct you to the CDC web page where the transcript is and point to the last two paragraphs. This data STANDS regardless of what some say

moeb – at 14:10

okay it was H2N2 not N1 it still stands:

“ We dissected out the H3N2 virus and found that even if you just had the surface glycoproteins of the H3N2 virus and then the avian internal virus genes, that that was not sufficient to transmissibility either, so again, that points to the fact that it’s a complex interaction between both the surface proteins and the internal genes” and: “in the work that we present in this report, we looked at one virus, an H5N1 virus that was isolated from an individual in 2003 that had one mutation in that area, that had not completely changed its receptor specificity, but causing the virus to head in the direction of having the binding abilities that are more like a human virus. And in that situation, even that virus didn’t transmit effectively”

anon_22 – at 14:20

NJ. Preppie,

Thank you for that clear and excellent exploration of some very complex issues.

Here’s a thought on the media question: if some folks here have been reading about this stuff for a while, but still needs discussions to clarify what they understand, we really should be under no illusion that the media can get it.

:-)

VincentCat 14:23

Scaredy Cat at 11:50- “And finally, I have been no more off topic than many others here. Exahibit A: anon_22 - at 18:05: that’s ok, I’m more of a MaiTai kind of person.”

Well done! Scaredy cat. I really admire your perseverane at promoting Niman and attacking anon_22. Keep up the effort.

anon_22 – at 14:25

NJ is right in that flu viruses appear to be in a state of ‘evolutionary stasis’ in birds, ie they do not evolve very much. It is when they get into other hosts that evolution and adaptation begins.

So a very simplified view would be that human flu viruses change rapidly, avian viruses in aquatic wild birds change very little, swine and equine sequences are intermediate.

moeb – at 14:26

I believe I already attacked Anon_22 with a wet fish

moeb – at 14:28

Disclaimer: however the fish in no way supports nemon

anon_22 – at 14:48

moeb,

I had to take a LOOOOONG shower….

:-)

moeb – at 14:50

yer killing me… and people will talk. so ah just to stay on topic I’ll mention the word “flu”

moeb – at 14:54

you’ll probably say reassortment may still lead to a pandemic… so let me ask you what percentage of risk do you assign to reassortment and pandemic (please taking into account the CDC news)?

anon_22 – at 15:13

moeb – at 14:54 “you’ll probably say reassortment may still lead to a pandemic… so let me ask you what percentage of risk do you assign to reassortment and pandemic (please taking into account the CDC news)?

WHAT! I get another person asking percentage risk!

So are you really moeb? Or are you you.know.who/anonymous?

:-)

Seriously, one can only give a percentage risk if there is data and precedence. For example, people can give a reasonably accurate answer for what’s the average SAT score at college entry that will put a person into the top 10% income bracket by age 35, because we can collect the data and follow these people up and find out how much they make etc, assuming education and employment patterns remain stable.

Even though we’ve had pandemics before, the fact is we do not have quantifiable information about previous pandemic risks, eg what kind of epidemiological data and viral sequence information in 1905, 1950, 1962, 1971, etc, just to make up a few, correlated with subsequent pandemic appearance (or not). You can’t calculate risk in quantitative terms unless you have prior quantitative data, and really good data at that, in my very humble non-mathmatician non-statistician opinion.

In addition, biological risks, especially multi-factorial ones, are a lot more complex to model, since biological systems operate with relationships that are far from linear or even 2-dimensional. There is in addition the issue of individual or collective behavior and policy changes that can happen to change the outcome dramatically.

So, I can’t say what the risk is. But I am concerned about reassortment for 2 reasons:

1) we have clear indication that this is a continuing source of new potentially pandemic strains,

2) the pandemic risk can change dramatically in a short space of time, as opposed to the current smoldering outbreaks which are progressing ‘slowly’ (fingers crossed) enough for us to watch and ponder and assess carefully.

moeb – at 15:17

who else would call themselves moeb? your final to points are valid (smiles, yea for 57 and 68′) meanwhile down on a the farm a pig goes “oink”

Tom DVM – at 15:31

N J Preppie. Excellent explanation!!

I would just add a couple of things to your post.

1) influenza as swine flu supposedly did not exist until H1N1 supposedly passed from people to pigs in 1918. Whether it existed and was not identified, is another matter.

2) If you read Dr. Osterholm’s paper in the New England Journal, I think May 2005, he explains in the introduction that pandemics as bad or worse have occured on a regular basis…

…1830 - 1918 - 2006? (interval 88 years)

The last serious pandemic before 1918 was in 1830…

…The bottom line is that H1N1 (1918) was not a ‘one-off freak’ but a regular occurence which means it will happen again.

Dennis in Colorado – at 15:42

Tom DVM – at 15:31 The bottom line is that H1N1 (1918) was not a ‘one-off freak’ but a regular occurence which means it will happen again.

Tom, I accept the second phrase (“it will happen again”) but respectfully question the first phrase (“it was a regular occurence”). Unless we have a third date reasonably close to 1742 (and, preferably, another close to 1654), we can’t say there is a regular interval … we only have two dates, 1830 & 1918.

anonymous – at 16:02

I thought flu evolves most in birds, then humans (antigenic sites in HA) then swine. Humans travel more than swine, but not as much as birds. Birds get all known flu-strains, humans and swine only a subset

NJ. Preppie – at 16:12

anonymous- “humans travel more like swine”, - I guess you’ve been on the subways too. But really, how do swine spread swine viruses? They seem contained in pens and get eaten every year, when do they matriculate? A DVM question -just wondering.

Scaredy Cat – at 16:51

Dem,

Why are my responses to people unacceptable and others’ (including yours) to me are not? Is it only okay to respond to someone if we are of the same mind as the mods?

Lack of clarity and consistency to The Rules is cause for concern.

ANON-YYZ – at 17:02

Scaredy Cat/Dem

Can you guys move this discussion about Rules to the Ask the Mods thread.

It’s becoming distracting, if not disruptive.

Thanks.

anonymous – at 17:05

Scaredy, as I understood that “warning”, it was only the anticipated fear to get another niman discussion ;-) , not what you had said so far but what you might continue. And Dem said “enough”. Enough is OK. But not so much more, at least not today.

anonymous – at 17:14

16:12, swine get it from other swine. Or humans (when feeding or vets?). Or birds (presumably rarer). Some swine change farms for breeding or piglets are sold. When the farmer is really careful, it should be possible to avoid it. But as always, when something is not so likely people become careless.

anon_22 – at 17:21

In most rural areas in Asia, pigs, chickens etc are all kept within very small areas.

Plus they routinely use manure from pigstys etc as fertilizers, while both domestic and wild aquatic ducks and chickens are allowed to roam free in the rice paddies to eat up any grains.

Its all a cooking pot. That’s how the farmers have operated for centuries, and that’s how they manage to feed their families. Nothing is wasted, not even ‘waste’.

Tom DVM – at 17:49

Dennis in Colorado. Point well taken…I did not explain myself well enough.

Dr. Osterholm in his New England Journal of Medicine Article (May 2005 I think) was the one to say that it was a regular occurence and I believe the serious ones occur on approx. an eighty year time interval.

When this was first brought up on flu wiki, my colleagues did trace outbreaks back several centuries…although it should be said that even information on the 1830 pandemic is ‘sketchy’ as well.

Tom DVM – at 17:50

Sorry, should have said…’probably sketchy’ as well.

Scaredy Cat – at 17:56

On further thought, sorry about my last post. Please disregard it and all others. Thanks.

Gillian

P.S. Anonymous, in America “Enough!” is what someone says to silence a child or an underling.

Tom DVM – at 18:01

Hi Scaredy. There is the new ‘Rant about Anything Thread’. I think it was put up so that if something is really bothering you…you can rant about it.

08 October 2006

Closed - Bronco Bill – at 22:04

Closed to maintain Forum speed.

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