This may not be protocol but this information seems important.
I’ll save you the trouble . . .
A Google search led me to this page:
http://www.vaccines.mil/default.asp…e/minidv&dID=57
About midway down the page is a link:
“Department of Defense Influenza Pandemic Preparation and Response Health”. . . and if you follow that link, you get a 38 page pdf . . . which I think is quite interesting.
I think you can also access the pdf through this link: https://fhp.osd.mil/aiWatchboard/Do…cy_Guidance.pdf
Thanks. Important information you found there!
I can’t access the links. My computer says their is a problem with their security certificate?
I can’t either. Can anyone comment on the content?
Please summarise key points or discuss A point.
Was this an on purpose leak of info or what, I can’t believe they’d (dod) would state military readiness in a public document.
Don’t know what kind of leak, if any kind - for all I know this has been around for 11 months and we have all just been too blind to see it . . .
There’s another pdf, only two pages, that makes a reference to H5N1 being present in the US. https://fhp.osd.mil/aiWatchboard/av…ifold_final.pdf
Clawdia at 20:47 — I get an error message when I try to access that page.
Does anyone have a quote or a question or a point of discussion?
Clawdia at 20:47 — I get an error message when I try to access that page.
Does anyone have a quote or a question or a point of discussion?
NS1 google the name William Winkenwerder, Jr. MD and Assistant Secretary of Defense and see if you can come up with something….It’s from December 23, 2005. It’s PDF so I can’t copy any of it.
A quick read was standard military terminology. I saved. If Yahoo can handle it, I can e-mail it.
On a pdf, do you see the letter T (select text) click on that & then you can copy and paste if its not protected and this one isn’t
No T on mine, that’s why I figured I would have to attach as a file.
Here’s the 2 page version - other version is extensive, should I copy that one and post here?
Know the warning signs of aVian fLU in birDs
This brochure represents United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) guidance
that has been adapted for the DoD beneficiary
population. Additional information can be found at www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usdahome. Early detection is key to preventing the spread of disease. Whether you own pet birds, are a farmer or avid bird watcher, or live near a pond or golf course with ducks or wild geese, you can play an important role in protecting everyone’s health.
Some of the warning signs of avian flu in birds
are:
• Sudden increase in bird deaths in flocks • Sneezing, coughing, gasping for air, and nasal discharge
• Watery and green fecal matter • Lack of energy and poor appetite • Drop in egg production or soft- or thin- shelled misshapen eggs • Swelling around the eyes, neck, and head • Purple discoloration of the wattles, combs, and legs • Tremors, drooping wings, circling, twisting of the head and neck, or lack of movement. If you see these signs of avian flu in birds near you, don’t wait. Contact your local health officials or the U.S. Department of Agriculture at 1–800–536–7593 and report sick or dying birds. Knowing the facts is the best preparation
Identify sources you can count on for reliable information. Having accurate and reliable information is critical and will help you make good health decisions for yourself and your family.
You can visit www.pandemicflu.gov to get
information on pandemic influenza and
www.deploymentlink.osd.mil for information
specific to servicemembers and their families.
In addition, servicemembers and their families
who have concerns about avian influenza
can get additional information by calling the Department of Defense Deployment Health Support Directorate toll-free at 1–800–497–6261, Monday to Friday, 8:30 AM to 5:00 PM Eastern Standard Time.
If you have birds or poultry and are concerned about their health, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) operates a toll-free hotline (1–800–536–7593) with veterinarians available to help you. There is no charge for this service.
Another source for information on avian
influenza is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Hotline at: 1–800-CDC
INFO (1–800–232–4636). This line is available in English and Spanish, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. TTY: 1–888–232–6348. Questions can be e-mailed to cdcinfo@cdc.gov.
Force Health Protection & Readiness
Safeguarding the health of those who protect us
Dealing with Birds and Poultry
A Guide for Service Members and Families
AVIAN FLU
Avian flu, also known as bird flu, is now in the
United States. At this time it continues to be primarily a disease affecting birds and NOT people. However, there are a number of simple
measures that you can take to minimize your risk of catching bird flu.
Do:
• Eat only USDA inspected poultry and eggs • Eat poultry that is fully cooked (internal temperature of 185 degrees F or no pink meat) • Wash your hands before and after handling raw poultry • Wash surfaces after contact with raw poultry • Eat only cooked eggs • Avoid contact with sick or dead birds Don’t:
• Eat wild birds • Eat poultry or eggs that have not been inspected by the USDA • Eat poultry that is not fully cooked • Touch sick or dead birds • Slaughter your own poultry People can catch avian flu by coming in contact with birds that are dead, dying or alive but infected with avian flu. Birds infected with avian flu have virus throughout their bodies
as well as in their saliva, droppings and
eggs. Avian flu can live in dead birds or bird
droppings for over a month. Refrigeration or
freezing does not kill the avian flu virus. The
virus can also stay alive on surfaces such as knives and tabletops for several weeks.
protect YoUrseLf
In order to avoid coming in contact with avian
flu:
• DO NOT eat wild birds or domestic poultry or eggs that have not been approved for consumption by the USDA. USDA inspected poultry and eggs ARE SAFE to eat. • Fully cooked poultry IS SAFE. Poultry needs to be cooked until there is no pink meat or until the internal temperature reaches 185 degrees F. • Those preparing poultry for consumption should always wash their hands before and after handling raw poultry. Surfaces and utensils used to prepare raw poultry should be washed following contact.
protect YoUr aniMaLs
Those with small backyard flocks of poultry for
personal consumption should not slaughter or eat these birds until authorities have declared it is safe to do so. Avoid coming in contact with wild geese or ducks on ponds, in parks, and on golf courses near homes or quarters. The appearance of sick or dead birds should be promptly reported to local health authorities.
Although most domestic poultry will become ill
shortly after developing avian flu, some may
appear well but still have the ability to cause an infection. This is especially true for wild birds such as ducks, geese, and swans.
Pet bird owners should keep their birds indoors and avoid contact with wild bird species.
Some other household pets could contract
avian flu. The disease has been found in cats
and ferrets. Pet owners should restrict their cat’s and ferret’s outdoor access, keep them away from wild birds, and avoid feeding them raw poultry.
excerpts from larger doc.
It’s 38 pages long but well worth the read. The DOD will control what happens inside CONUS Not HHS. Some highlights of the doc. are the Community Containment measures and Quarantine. Also, The Federal Joint Information System will control info. Every NIMS compliant Hospital will have a rep from (JIS) “Many Voices” “One Message”.
DOD will be able to enact Emergency Powers over ALL segments of Civil opps.
Department of Defense
Influenza Pandemic Preparation and Response Health Policy Guidance
December 23, 2005
I. References. See Appendix 5.
II. Situation. Influenza epidemics occur seasonally, generally in winter months. Medical plans
and annual vaccines minimize impacts of annual influenza epidemics in the United States
(references a, c, d). Influenza pandemics occur infrequently and cause substantially higher
morbidity and mortality. Whereas annual, seasonal epidemics have the greatest impact on
elderly and medically high-risk groups, pandemics are likely to cause high levels of
morbidity and mortality in all populations. Because of this, an influenza pandemic could
have a significant impact on military operations. The US Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) and the World Health Organization (WHO) drafted influenza pandemic
preparedness plans (references l and s). The Department of Defense (DoD) must also
prepare for an influenza pandemic.
III. Purpose. This document supersedes reference b. This guidance provides policy and
instructions to prepare for and respond to an influenza pandemic. The goal of this guidance
is to maintain operational effectiveness by minimizing death, disease, and lost duty time due
to an influenza pandemic. It provides assumptions and considerations at the DoD level and
directs subordinate units throughout the DoD to develop plans appropriate for their areas of
responsibility. This DoD guidance facilitates integration into the National Strategy for
Pandemic Influenza (reference n), outlines an appropriate response for military installations
and contingency operations around the world, and provides guidance for defense support to
civil authorities (reference h). This document only addresses a pandemic due to influenza
virus. Other strategies will be necessary to deal with non-influenza pandemics.
IV. Applicability. This guidance applies to the Military Departments, the Joint Staff, and the
Combatant Commands. It is provided to the US Coast Guard as a reference.
V. Assumptions.
A. Pandemic influenza assumptions:
1. An influenza pandemic could occur in any season and could affect a substantial
portion of the world population.
2. Most US military personnel would be susceptible to the illness.
3. Once an influenza pandemic is introduced into the United States, it could spread
quickly to all parts of the country.
4. A pandemic in the US could result in 20–35% of the population becoming ill, 3%
being hospitalized, and 1% dying.
5. In an affected community, a pandemic outbreak will last about 6–10 weeks.
Multiple pandemic disease waves are likely.
2
B. Civil support assumptions:
1. The DoD will support the HHS in the national effort by, among other things,
conducting medical and laboratory surveillance and diagnostic testing through DoD
members of the Laboratory Response Network (LRN), and by participating on the
Food and Drug Administration Vaccines and Related Biologic Products Advisory
Committee and the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices as influenza vaccine recommendations are formulated
(reference f). 2. In the event of a pandemic, DoD may, under applicable authorities, assist civil
authorities by providing logistical and medical support (e.g., emergency
immunization clinics, antiviral drug distribution, and supportive medical care as
needed.)
3. In an emergency, combatant commanders, local military commanders and
responsible officials of the DoD components located in areas affected by the
influenza pandemic may, upon a civilian request, respond immediately to save
lives, mitigate human suffering, minimize property damage, or restore essential
operations and services (reference h).
C. Antiviral drug assumptions:
1. Should pandemic influenza occur before vaccine is available, use of antiviral drugs
may reduce the impact on military units.
2. Due to limitations in manufacturing capacity and competing civilian public health
requirements, the amount of anti-influenza drugs available to the DoD for treatment
and prophylaxis will most likely be insufficient to meet demands.
D. Medical care assumptions:
1. In an influenza pandemic, military and civilian medical treatment facilities may be
overwhelmed, particularly with patients with viral and bacterial pneumonia.
2. Support of critically ill patients could require increased medical staff, increased
numbers of ventilators, and increased monitoring equipment.
3. Shortages of medical supplies, food deliverables, medical care personnel, support
staff, and other important commodities may seriously impede the ability of
hospitals to meet the increased demand for medical care.
4. In a moderate pandemic, there will be a 25% increase in demand for intensive care
and in-patient beds as estimated by the CDC. Depending on the extent of the
pandemic, the demand could be larger.
5. Demand for mortuary affairs support may be considerable.
E. Vaccine assumptions:
1. The DoD will use the same vaccine formulation as the US civilian population.
3
2. The HHS and the DoD will cooperate to assure that DoD vaccine requirement
priorities are recognized and are met as appropriate for national security needs, in
light of national health care priorities.
3. The time between identification of a new strain and vaccine availability may be six
to nine months.
4. A vaccine against the pandemic strain would either be licensed by the FDA,
probably through a supplement to a prior influenza vaccine license, be authorized
for use through the process applicable to Emergency Use Authorizations (EUA) (21
USC 360bbb-3), or be available through the process applicable to Investigational
New Drugs (IND) used for Force Health Protection (reference i).
5. Once a licensed vaccine is available and supplies are adequate, military units could
be immunized within a few months. Timetables and immunization rates with
vaccine under EUA or IND rules are more uncertain.
6. Individuals would require two immunizations, and a total of 6 weeks (from the time
of the first vaccination) for maximum immunity.
F. Laboratory Assumptions:
1. Both DoD and non-DoD laboratories that are LRN reference and national
laboratories will conduct rule in/rule out testing for the pandemic virus in active
duty and beneficiary populations. 2. A pandemic could quickly overwhelm existing laboratory diagnostic capabilities.
The most intense testing will be during the early stages of the pandemic.
3. Department of Defense clinical laboratory assets may be called upon to supplement
testing capabilities of the US civilian sector.
4. Critical laboratory reagents/shipping supplies for identifying pandemic strains are
likely to become scarce.
G. Operational assumptions:
1. It is possible that medical response to an influenza pandemic will be required while
military forces are simultaneously engaged in armed conflict.
2. Ground Operations. Should an influenza pandemic affect US forces during field
operations, the number of ill, dying, and dead personnel would have a significant
impact on force strength, perhaps causing curtailment of the operation. Opposing
forces would be similarly affected.
3. Air Operations.
a. It is possible that entire aircrews could become ill simultaneously in flight.
b. Influenza may be rapidly spread across long distances by persons traveling by
air.
4
c. Curtailing passenger air transportation completely might temporarily delay
movement of influenza from one region to another, but the disease would
probably arrive eventually.
d. Restriction of movement between affected and unaffected areas may be
helpful. Civilian air transportation may be seriously affected in a worldwide
pandemic resulting in inability to move people and supplies, including
emergency medical supplies.
e. In most instances, it would be best not to utilize air evacuation to transport
patients with pandemic influenza (PI). However, if the patient must be moved,
infection control procedures must be utilized in accordance with reference o.
4. Sea Operations. Influenza pandemic outbreaks on shipboard are likely to spread
with great efficiency. Consequently, a large proportion of crews are likely to be ill
simultaneously. Onboard medical facilities will be quickly overwhelmed.
VI. Legal Considerations.
A. CONUS installation commanders are authorized to implement emergency health
powers on their installations in order to protect military personnel and property
(reference j). These special powers include restriction of movement and use of disease
containment strategies (isolation, quarantine, social distancing) as well as medical
evaluation and treatment. In exercising emergency health powers, installation
commanders should obtain advice from their installation’s Medical Treatment Facility
Commander, Public Health Emergency Officer (PHEO), and legal staff.
B. Installation commanders at OCONUS locations will be restricted in implementation of
Emergency Health Powers by Host Nation law and applicable international agreements.
This may affect any movement of host nation assets.
VII. Execution.
A. Operational priorities. Other than for categories 1 and 2 below, actual priorities for use
of limited supplies of vaccine and antiviral drugs will be addressed based on emerging
circumstances. In addition, priorities may change with the phase of the pandemic, both
globally, as well as locally. Potential priority uses include:
1. Maintaining the health and operational capability of the fighting force. This is
accomplished through preventive methods and appropriate medical treatment. <snip> Influenza Pandemic Preparation and Response Policy Guidance
APPENDIX 3: Public Health Measures for Community Containment
I. Situation. Until supplies of effective vaccines and antiviral medications are available and
administered, community containment and infection control measures may play a significant
role in containing the spread of disease during the Pandemic Alert Period (Pandemic Phases
3–5). It is DoD policy to use the Health and Human Services (HHS) Pandemic Influenza
Plan, Part II Supplements on Public Health Guidance
(http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/#part2) within the DoD. Note that HHS guidance
may be updated as the pandemic progresses. The following paragraphs summarize the HHS
guidance.
II. Goal of Community Containment and Infection Control Measures. The goal of community
containment and infection control measures in the community, used in Phases 3–5, is to
contain infections at their source or, if containment is not possible, to prevent or slow the
spread of the disease. Public health measures during this time should be tailored to
maximize impact on preventing and slowing disease transmission while minimizing, to the
degree possible, restrictions on individual movement. Measures to be used in Pandemic
Phase (Phase 6) may include a different set of containment considerations. Periodic
reassessment of viral characteristics and the distribution and clinical presentation of cases
will help guide the most appropriate responses. For example, movement restrictions may
have limited efficacy due to a very short incubation period and the ability of asymptomatic
individuals to shed the virus.
III. Planning for Community Containment (primarily for Pandemic Phases 3–5):
A. All installations should establish community containment plans that include
triggers/thresholds for implementation of containment measures.
B. The plans should include the identification of appropriate outpatient, treatment,
isolation, and quarantine facilities and communications networks.
C. All installations should exercise the plans with traditional partners (e.g., public heath
and healthcare workers) and non-traditional community partners (e.g., transportation
workers).
IV. Considerations for all Pandemic Alert and Pandemic Periods (Pandemic Phases 3–6):
A. Developing and implementing community-wide risk communications plans with key
messages for each phase of the pandemic.
B. Community-wide infection control education including decreasing social contact and
social distancing, and hygiene (coughing, sneezing, and handwashing and optional use
of masks).
C. Medical evaluation and isolation or quarantine of persons who are exhibiting signs of
influenza-like illness.
D. Delivery of medical care, food, and services to persons in isolation or quarantine taking
into account special needs of children and persons with disabilities.
29
E. Protocols for monitoring and, when necessary, enforcing quarantine measures.
F. Mental health services for persons in isolation or quarantine, as well as to family
members of affected persons and other community members.
G. Telephone hotlines for reporting influenza-like symptoms and for obtaining directions
for self care or instructions to report for professional medical care. H. Developing protocols for staff members that include training and triage decision
trees/algorithms.
V. Considerations for Community Containment in the Pandemic Period (Pandemic Phase 6)
when widespread transmission is occurring and medical resources (people, supplies, and
space) may be constrained.
A. Community-based containment measures:
1. Measures, including quarantine, that affect groups of exposed or at-risk persons.
2. Measures applying to use of specific buildings.
3. Measures that affect communities.
a. “Snow days” for at least an initial 10-day period and self-shielding (choosing
to stay home).
b. Alternative/additional location fever clinics.
c. Cancellation of public events and closure of offices, churches, shopping
centers (commissary and exchanges), schools, child care facilities, and public
transportation.
d. Widespread community quarantine (home or community-based) with
provisions for supplies and service for monitoring and enforcing, when
required.
B. At termination of Phase 6, scaling back community containment measures.
30
Influenza Pandemic Preparation and Response Policy Guidance
APPENDIX 4: Pandemic Influenza Immunization Guidance
a. Purpose. This appendix provides policy guidance to prepare an effective immunization plan in
response to an influenza pandemic. The DoD is implementing a pandemic influenza
immunization program to preserve combat capabilities and readiness, save lives, and reduce
human suffering.
b. Influenza Vaccines.
A. Seasonal influenza vaccine. Each year seasonal influenza morbidity and mortality are
successfully prevented in military populations through the use of the same influenza vaccine
used in civilian communities. A network of laboratories, coordinated by the World Health
Organization (WHO) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), collects
and analyzes thousands of influenza virus isolates. DoD’s laboratory-based influenza
surveillance program augments both the global and national programs. Following annual
review of data from isolates and epidemiological studies, the Vaccines and Related
Biological Products Advisory Committee (VRBPAC), a federal advisory committee to the
US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), makes recommendations for the contents of the
next season’s influenza vaccine. Usually, the influenza vaccine is tri-valent (i.e., contains 3
strains representing the 3 circulating strains expected to cause the most morbidity and
mortality). The seasonal influenza vaccine typically protects against A/H1N1, A/H3N2, and
B types of influenza.
B. Pandemic influenza vaccine. For a new pandemic strain of influenza, VRBPAC will make
recommendations regarding emergency manufacture of a new influenza vaccine, probably a
monovalent vaccine to counter the strain causing the pandemic. The expected interval from
a decision to make a new vaccine to initial distribution of the vaccine is 6 to 9 months.
C. Currently, a potential H5N1 avian influenza vaccine is in production that may be available
before a pandemic occurs. This vaccine, known as “1203,” is based on a seed virus isolated
from a young boy from Viet Nam who died of H5N1 influenza in 2004. Clinical trials
indicated that two 90 mcg immunizations, 28 days apart are required to induce presumptive
immunity. Pending additional studies, the amount of vaccine required may be reduced.
Doesn’t seem too radical…
Found this power point presentation: DOD Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Recovery System. Very nice presentation.
Argyll.
This spells out martial law. Am I correct ?
Before we become very involved, and perhaps carried-away with the long document, we should read, and re-read the cover memo, and note the context of individual lines of text.
The long document is a guidline for installation commanders and their staffs for planning within those installations. It is not a directive for those installations.
Additionally, except for a few beneign references to aid civilian authorities when asked and to coordinate health repsonse with civilian authority,etc, it does not immediately appear to refer to military-civilian interraction. The term “community” in this context, is the military community and their families under the jurisdiction of a local commander.
Before we become very involved, and perhaps carried-away with the long document, we should read, and re-read the cover memo, and note the context of individual lines of text.
The long document is a guidline for installation commanders and their staffs for planning within those installations. It is not a directive for those installations.
Additionally, except for a few beneign references to aid civilian authorities when asked and to coordinate health repsonse with civilian authority,etc, it does not immediately appear to refer to military-civilian interraction. The term “community” in this context, is the military community and their families under the jurisdiction of a local commander.
oops, that should be “response” and NOT “recovery” system. Sorry for the error.
Argyll.
Another important read: Influenza Pandemic — DOD
http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/d061042_1.pdf
Argyll.
rural dweller 21:27 the document states that bird flu is already in the US and gives recommendations etc.- what are we talking about here? HP H5N1?-I doubt they would make those recommendations for LP.
I’ve read the larger document. No need to panic. Standard military-ese no plots to take over control or anything similar. The services will help HHS if requested.
Italics = excerpt from the PDF:
WHO Pandemic has ended. This determination can be made when indices of influenza activity have reverted to pre-pandemic levels, and immunity to the novel virus strain is widespread in the population.
Commment: By this definition, it is easy to see how planning assumptions as mentioned in the Checkmate thread are that a pandemic will last three years.
‘’At this time, after-action reports and lessons learned should be prepared at all levels as directed, and forward through the Combat Commands to be documented in the Joint Lessons Learned Databases.’‘
Comment: That’ll make for some interesting reading. And a Joint Lessons Learned Database?! Who knew!
Seriously though, this document is a good tool for we trend watchers here when taken in light of the mantra, “Pay attention to what they do, not what they say.”
I know all minds are on the large document, but what about the 2 page one. the document states that bird flu IS in the US and that one should not eat any other poultry products other that FDA approved. -Am I the only one outraged that the general public has not been informed of this. -Many people I know raise their own poultry and sell it to neighbors and friends:-(-It also gives the warning about the possibility of dogs and cats getting infected. Should not not go out to the general public? (Date of document is Oct.13)
well, we’ve known for awhile there is low path H5N1 in North America. I read the above and think that DoD has some well informed person writing this plan and laying out military contengencies. OF COURSE the military would be called in by local authorities if there is civil unrest — happened after Hurricane Katrina — no big whoop there. Safegaurding food supplies? No different than what flu wikian’s have been saying about “read your labels” when you buy stuff.
I’m not too excited about this — just glad that some TPTB are getting their heads around the possibilities.
It’ll be a cold day in a hot place before I’m “glad” to see documents such as these. :(
Olymom-The document does not say “Low path”. -I know they always announced LP in the past, but never before have people been told not to eat poultry ,to watch and restrict pets etc .I don’t think they would give that type of advice for LP.-I just checked curevents and there is some speculation that it may be an advanced notice to the military, and it will be announced to the general public later.Yeah right ! I’m aggravated and I’m going to bed.-good night.!
what/who is DOD ?
Public Law 109–364, or the “John Warner Defense Authorization Act of 2007″ (H.R.5122) (2), which was signed by the commander in chief on October 17th, 2006, in a private Oval Office ceremony, allows the President to declare a “public emergency” and station troops anywhere in America and take control of state-based National Guard units without the consent of the governor or local authorities. The term for putting an area under military law enforcement control is precise; the term is “martial law.”
Section 1076 of the massive Authorization Act, is entitled, “Use of the Armed Forces in Major Public Emergencies.” Section 333, “Major public emergencies; interference with State and Federal law” states that “the President may employ the armed forces, including the National Guard in Federal service, to restore public order and enforce the laws of the United States when, as a result of a natural disaster, epidemic, or other serious public health emergency, terrorist attack or incident, or other condition in any State or possession of the United States, the President determines that domestic violence has occurred to such an extent that the constituted authorities of the State or possession are incapable of (“refuse” or “fail” in) maintaining public order, “in order to suppress, in any State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy.”
anonymous – at 02:04
Department of Defense (of the United States)
BTW, you may wonder how this could have come about.
This language was slipped into the legislation at the last minute as a rider with little study by congressional committees with jurisdiction over these matters. Our lawmakers were given no chance to comment, let alone hold hearings on these proposals.
There was one lone voice of dissent, that of Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont).
worrywart – at 01:35
Seems strange to me that there is a nasty flu in the states now, there is supposed to be some kind of anouncement in the near future and now this info “The document does not say “Low path”. -I know they always announced LP in the past, but never before have people been told not to eat poultry ,to watch and restrict pets etc “.
Where did you hear that there is some kind of anouncement in the near future?
The two page document looks like the kind of material that would be used when there is confirmed flu. I don’t think the existance of the document means anything, it is just material that is ready to be used. Has it been printed and distributed? I don’t think so.
I tried the link www.deploymentlink.osd.mil, it has a link to DOD Pandemic Influenza Watchboard, which has the following: Current Phase: Pandemic Alert Period Phase 3 - Human infection(s) with a new subtype, but no human-to-human spread, or at most rare instances of spread to a close contact.
Which we all know is the current state of events. So don’t panic. It just means someone has been planning.
aurora – at 03:08
Just working from memory (which is not that great) but seemed to me that in the conversations on the (fake bird flu drill) last week there was some conversation about some expected anouncement this coming week. Maybe some one out there may have some further details.
aurora – at 03:08
Went back and reviewed a few of the threads and the expected anouncement was made last week about the new changes to the virus making it more likely to combine with the standard flu virus. So I was wrong no anouncement due this week.
not concerned about the changes in October - people should be more concerned that those changes are necessary, than that all but one of the Senate and House voted in favor; not surprised it was a Democrat that voted against.
not surprised that military documents have different advice than civilian documents - the military goes into places that civilians do not, and just because someone in the military is in the Staes today, is no indication that they will be tomorrow. with that in mind, i’d be concerned if they didn’t have safe handling procedures in place for poultry last year, especially given the spread in 1918.
i don’t see anything new, or concerning..
What does “low path” mean, anyway? Isthe high path H5N1 said low path in those occasions when it doesn’t kill vaccinated birds?
worrywart – at 00:57 If you know some of the general public that hasn’t seen these, pass them along:
FAO Special Report(Which I think should have been titled avian influenza/H5N1 & Mammals - and distributed to the public, but, I digress…)has Recommendation, Information, and Advice, to the public and to animal doctors -read both.
USGS Wildlife Health Bulletin #05-03 HPAI H5N1 Recommendations and Precautions for Hunters and Field Biologists -again; might as well read for both even if you aren’t one.
G.
3. Air Operations.
a. It is possible that entire aircrews could become ill simultaneously in flight.
I wouldn’t want to be on that flight!
JWB – at 07:02
My thoughts exactly. With stories from 1918 of people going in to work in the a.m. and dropping dead a couple hours later, well, you can imagine where my thoughts went with that one!
Mine were, “not (crashing) in my backyard, please!” (since I’ve already been avoiding flying.)
the recommendations meet the criteria of HP H5N1 in birds ( in the us). I was just questioning why the recommendations are different for military and are not passed down to the general public.-No such recommendations have been made. it just reminds me of the HK advise to stock up for 12 weeks, when the public was told to prep for 2 weeks.
This may be of some interest. It is a link to the WHO concerning avian influenza. Look to the question, “Are there any other concerns?”
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/avian_faqs/en/index.html#apartfrom
Argyll.
“Are there any other causes for concern?
Yes. Several.
• Domestic ducks can now excrete large quantities of highly pathogenic virus without showing signs of illness, and are now acting as a “silent” reservoir of the virus, perpetuating transmission to other birds.
This adds yet another layer of complexity to control efforts and removes the warning signal for humans to avoid risky behaviours.
• When compared with H5N1 viruses from 1997 and early 2004, H5N1 viruses now circulating are more lethal to experimentally infected mice and to ferrets (a mammalian model) and survive longer in the environment.
• H5N1 appears to have expanded its host range, infecting and killing mammalian species previously considered resistant to infection with avian influenza viruses.
• The behaviour of the virus in its natural reservoir, wild waterfowl, may be changing. The spring 2005 die-off of upwards of 6,000 migratory birds at a nature reserve in central China, caused by highly pathogenic H5N1, was highly unusual and probably unprecedented. In the past, only two large die-offs in migratory birds, caused by highly pathogenic viruses, are known to have occurred: in South Africa in 1961 (H5N3) and in Hong Kong in the winter of 2002–2003 (H5N1).”
If a vaccinated duck gets HP H5N1 but doesn’t fall ill because of the vaccination, but from a hunter’s bullet, is the H5N1 then called LP? Even if the hunter might fall dead by H5N1 infection later?
The question might sound stupid, but really, what makes the virus LP?
Sailor
Yes, you are exactly right, the fact that we now know that H5N1 can mix with seasonal flu. This is not good.
Mary in Hawaii explains this really well in the New Cases in Egypt thread:
Mary in Hawaii – at 02:47 NS1 and Under The Radar at 23:52. The way I understand Niman’s theories is that we would have to have two viruses circulating in the same host, one avian with serine in position 223, {making it able to form a 2,3 linkage to a cell which in birds is usually in the digestive tract and in humans is only common far down in the respiratory tract} and the other a mammalian virus with asparagine in position 223, thus able to form a 2,6 linkage, which in humans is common in the upper respiratory tract. Next the avian flu virus and the human flu virus must both be able to infect the same single cell and once inside - during the RNA replication stage - switch sections of their genes, so that the avian flu virus acquires the genetic code for asparagine in the 223 position, and the human virus acquires the code for serine in the 223 position. This would give the avian flu virus the ability to infect the upper respiratory tract of humans without losing any of the other parts of its genetic make-up that cause it to be so lethal. Right so far?
This presupposes that the host cell of the human (or other mammalian host) has receptors for both 2,3 and 2,6 linkages on a single cell. Is this true? Are there simply more 2,3 sites in the lower respiratory tract and more 2,6 sites in the upper tract, and that is why the avian virus with its 2,3 linkage usually only infects the lower respiratory tract of humans?
As for Under the Radar’s concern, unless there was a recombination event in which the avian influenza virus also switched a section of its gene that was responsible for the severity of the illness with the human one, it doesn’t seem like this recombination would make the new human flu virus (influenza B, for example)any more virulent. As a matter of fact, it seems like it would be less infectious, due to it now having a linkage site that is too low in the respiratory tract to easily get to or get out of.
On the other hand, mutation by substitution at the 223 site seems to me also a distinct possibility, since the genetic code for Asparagine (AAU or AAC) is only one nucleotide different from codes for Serine (AGU or AGC.) A simple error in transcription as the virus begins copying its genetic material inside the host cell could easily cause the changes.
Most likely both recombination and substitution play a part. All of this is purely conjecture and thinking out loud on my part, but would appreciate any feedback and corrections on my line of thinking from those with more expertise.
The virus can also stay alive on surfaces such as knives and tabletops for several weeks.
Glad to see this info, I had thought it stayed alive on hard surfaces for about 2 days.
worrywart – at 08:23
Yeah, you and me both!
worrywart, based on what I’ve seen in other countries, I don’t think we will see an announcement that high path H5N1 is in the US until we get human cases.
Oremus,
I guess picnics (at the local park) might be out of the question? I just visited a park with my kids last week. Thought it was interesting that they mentioned knives.
Wonder if this would apply to tabletops such as an outdoor patio set.
Argyll
Thinlina – at 10:50
Well, I hope there is no such thing as a stupid question, because I would like to understand that a little better myself also!
I think what it is is that when birds, domesticated birds, of course (probably not too many wild birds that get vaccinated! lol) that have the virus vaccinated and then the high path virus can evolve so that the vaccination doesn’t work anymore and the new, stronger version of the virus then gets passed through hosts and becomes stronger. The wild birds and the domestic birds can pass the virus back and forth between them.
A wild duck can have the high path without getting sick. The high path can have the genetic material to infect the hunter. The hunter shoots the infected duck and gets the virus from the infected duck. He doesn’t know that the duck is infected because the duck doesn’t look sick, and, from what he’s been told, he thinks that all wild birds with high path will look sick.
I don’t recall exactly what the difference is between the high path and the low path, except that I think there is a difference in the proteins on the HA molecule of the virus. The HA part is the part that does the job of attaching onto the host cell and burrowing into it to release it’s genetic material and hijack the host call for its own evil purposes. lol Anyway, the bottom line is that the low path can evolve into the high path.
Maybe someone here who understand that a little better can help us out here?
Thinlina – at 05:33
What does “low path” mean, anyway? Isthe high path H5N1 said low path in those occasions when it doesn’t kill vaccinated birds?
Thinlina – at 10:50
If a vaccinated duck gets HP H5N1 but doesn’t fall ill because of the vaccination, but from a hunter’s bullet, is the H5N1 then called LP? Even if the hunter might fall dead by H5N1 infection later?
The question might sound stupid, but really, what makes the virus LP?
The definition of HPAI is technically made on its ability to kill 75% of chickens. In addition, HPAI is distinguished from LPAI by the presence of a distinct sequence of amino acids between HA1 and HA2, in the location where the HA molecule has to be ‘cleaved’ or split up before it can infect any cell. This distinguishing feature is sufficient to tell whether a strain found in asymptomatic ducks or even chickens is HP or LP.
Argyll and Oremus
Yikes, I’m with you! It certainly gives one pause. A person can become infected with the virus from the wild birds in a lot of ways. The virus that the wild birds carry can contain genetic material that has been acquired from human hosts.
Then the virus can mix with human virus in someone who has the human flu at the same time, then give that version of the virus to another person, and so on. Each time it passes through a host it can change a little, that’s what viruses (virii?) do, and it has the potential to become more and more transmissible and virulent. Eventually it will probably lose most of it’s virulence, but in the meantime…
Under The Radar – at 12:59
Then the virus can mix with human virus in someone who has the human flu at the same time, then give that version of the virus to another person, and so on. Each time it passes through a host it can change a little, that’s what viruses (virii?) do, and it has the potential to become more and more transmissible and virulent. Eventually it will probably lose most of it’s virulence, but in the meantime…
Yes. One thing to keep in mind, though, is that pandemics have happened only 3 times last century. Given the many many opportunities for flu viruses to change and adapt and reassort, the requirements for actually forming a pandemic strain could be quite stringent.
Otherwise, we would probably be seeing pandemics a lot more often.
That pandemics have happened “only” three times last century may or may not be relevant to the current situation. The world is a far different place now than it was even so short a time ago as 1968. There are more drugs and vaccines in use, it’s far easier to travel from one side of the world to the other in a short period of time . . . so many things have changed.
I’m not so sure that the requirements for formation of a pandemic virus haven’t changed, too.
I’m not so sure that the requirements for formation of a pandemic virus haven’t changed, too.
Even in the context of H5N1, millions and millions of people have been exposed. Now I’m concerned about it, no doubt about that, especially given the increasing clusters, the emergence of a single dominant strain in China, and now Egypt seem to be bubbling away. But we also need to keep risk in perspective, and not to frighten ourselves unnecessarily, IMHO. I was following from previous remarks about hunters getting infected and therefore the viruses mixing with human ones, and so on, and pointing out that this situation probably happens far more often than we think, and so the fact that there hasn’t been far far more pandemics than the current 3 in 100 years is something to keep in mind, so as to appropriately assess the probability of hunters in the US getting infected with LPAI as source of a pandemic virus.
I just poste this on the rumor thread. I realize now that it is not new NEWS but my questions still stand.
I was poking around the DOD site today and found a page with informational brochures for DOD personnel. One was for service members so I went there and clicked on the one marked FLYER: Protecting Yourself from Avian Flu: Health Advice for Service Members Involved in Animal Culling and Disease Management and Eradication Activities. It was updated October 13. I have been reading a lot on here about the embassy getting word to prep for 12 weeks vs. 2 so I thought I might find something. It was just the basic ‘wash your hands, cook your food, report illness’ yada yada yada. BUT, the first sentence caught my eye. It states, “The Defense Departmen’s mission during this outbreak of avian flu is to preserve combat capabilities….” and “DoD personnel have been called on to assist…” I have been lazy about reading the news so maybe I am jumping at shadows but I have a few questions. Maybe you can help. 1. When the flyer states ‘during THIS outbreak’ of avian flu, what exactly are they refering to? 2. Has there been any news about DOD/military helping with chicken/farm yard round ups? Anywhere? 3. Is it possible this link is for a flyer that will be sent out a later day or is there some soldier somewhere reading over this flyer after a long day of dragging bags of chickens to the fire pit?
Here is the link. Please check it out. Actually, there is a LOT of information on this site, including a 38 page DOD response plan. Sobering. https://fhp.osd.mil/aiWatchboard/servicemembers.html
Clawdia – at 13:26
That pandemics have happened “only” three times last century may or may not be relevant to the current situation. The world is a far different place now than it was even so short a time ago as 1968. There are more drugs and vaccines in use, it’s far easier to travel from one side of the world to the other in a short period of time . . . so many things have changed.
I’m not so sure that the requirements for formation of a pandemic virus haven’t changed, too.
---
I think a case in point on Clawdia’s musings is the CFR and the fact that WHO now believes it doesn’t have to drop in virility to become a pandemic.
That goes against what was “known” prior to the latest study.
I too believe we are re-writing the virology and history books.
Lots of causes, environmental, faster jet travel to more diverse places causes faster mixing, who knows, but I firmly belive this is not your grandfather’s pandemic potential.
We are now into the “don’t know what we don’t know” territory, instead of “know what we don’t know”.
On the fence and leaning – at 00:00
Folks might really want to be more careful about snooping around on .mil sites. Consider this from the main page:
Notice: The information contained within this web site is for official use only and is not for public distribution. Access to this site is restricted to the “.mil” domain.
anon_22 – at 13:48
I’m glad, you’re becoming more balanced.
Let’s wait for the Chinese new year…
c3jmp - So - did you see “Top Secret” or any such stamped on this document?
I strongly suspect the military is adept enough at hiding information that nothing gets out that they don’t want to get out. As far as “snooping” . . . if you can get there by way of Google, it’s hard to argue that whatever you find is anywhere other than in the public domain.
(Clear your .mil cookie if it’ll make you feel better)
nah… i’ve tracked down folks that broke the law on the net, under federal court order - i’m fine with it if you are. just didn’t want anyone to get caught by surprise.
Thanks, UTR and anon_22! anon_22 – at 12:46 The definition of HPAI is technically made on its ability to kill 75% of chickens. In addition, HPAI is distinguished from LPAI by the presence of a distinct sequence of amino acids between HA1 and HA2, in the location where the HA molecule has to be ‘cleaved’ or split up before it can infect any cell. This distinguishing feature is sufficient to tell whether a strain found in asymptomatic ducks or even chickens is HP or LP.
1) But if the LP/HP difference is made only of the virus’ ability to kill chickens, then what is the meaning of LP/HP division to humans? Chicken LP can be very HP to humans?
2) If LP virus has an amino acid sequence between HA1 and HA2 that can’t be cleaved and so the virus can’t infect any cell, then how could it infect at all the bird that it is carried by?
1) But if the LP/HP difference is made only of the virus’ ability to kill chickens, then what is the meaning of LP/HP division to humans? Chicken LP can be very HP to humans?
As far as I know, there hasn’t been documented cases of human infection (ie causing disease) with LPAI. There are instances where antibodies have been found in hunters, but that’s not the same as disease-causing.
2) If LP virus has an amino acid sequence between HA1 and HA2 that can’t be cleaved and so the virus can’t infect any cell, then how could it infect at all the bird that it is carried by?
No, not that it can’t be cleaved, but it can only be cleaved by a limited range of cells, thus causing mild disease, whereas with HPAI cleavage can occur in multiple organ systems, resulting in fulminating systemic disease in chicken.
‘’‘c3jmp – at 02:40 nah… i’ve tracked down folks that broke the law on the net, under federal court order - i’m fine with it if you are. just didn’t want anyone to get caught by surprise. ‘’‘
I’d scream bloody murder, to get the publics’ attention and then ask DOD to answer WHY the general public wasn’t given this information !
Then there’s the document that says H5N1 is IN THE US. And John Q. Public isn’t being told that either.
THAT reminds me of the old Civil Defense posters, in the bars….#10. Bend over, grab your ankles, and kiss your a$$ godbye. :-(
Tell the dinosauers to move over…..
The more I thought about this information not being released to the general public, the more I realized that it the publics overall well-being that is mostly likely being considered. For many share the belief that, “no news is good news.” I can only imagine the information that must keep them up at night. The big questions == when do we tell citizens? Razor thin decisions.
I am sure TPTB are balancing very carefully what they tell citizens. They want citizens to remain calm, confident and most importantly continue to “trust” the government that works overtime to protect them.
I guess for me the bottom line is — those that work for the federal government have families too, and they do care about us. The amount of work and effort that has gone into their preparedness efforts is staggering. While I wish some information would have been released earlier, I understand was it has not. I support their efforts so far and think they have done a great job. Would I like to know more? Sure, but I am not sure if my next door neighbor is ready for all of that.
I am very glad the PSA’s are coming out now — they are a step in the right direction. It will slowly warm the public up to the idea of preparedness and get them planning and moving in the right direction.
p.s. I am a career mom.
Argyll.
“1) But if the LP/HP difference is made only of the virus’ ability to kill chickens, then what is the meaning of LP/HP division to humans? Chicken LP can be very HP to humans?
As far as I know, there hasn’t been documented cases of human infection (ie causing disease) with LPAI. There are instances where antibodies have been found in hunters, but that’s not the same as disease-causing. “
Does this mean that people can’t be infected with H5N1 if it isn’t fatal to birds? It doesn’t quite fit to logic. If H5N1 can only be transferred intercontinental by migrating birds, it should be LP in order to travel with birds.
Does this mean that people can’t be infected with H5N1 if it isn’t fatal to birds? It doesn’t quite fit to logic. If H5N1 can only be transferred intercontinental by migrating birds, it should be LP in order to travel with birds.
No, I think you are confusing LPAI with being ‘not fatal to birds’. LPAI is a distinct entity from HPAI, as I explained earlier.
However, HPAI H5N1 can also be not fatal to birds, even asymptomatic, such as what is happening in China with vaccinated chickens. HPAI H5N1 is also frequently not fatal to ducks and geese, particularly wild ones. But the virus being carried by these birds are still dangerous for humans if they catch it.
c3jmp – at 01:38 Notice: The information contained within this web site is for official use only and is not for public distribution. Access to this site is restricted to the “.mil” domain.
Yeah, right. And it’s illegal to rip the labels off mattresses.
Argyll – at 06:42 I guess for me the bottom line is — those that work for the federal government have families too, and they do care about us. The amount of work and effort that has gone into their preparedness efforts is staggering.
A little anecdote about caring families…my aunt’s sister- and brother-in-law, with whom my aunt has regular contact, work in the “upper echelons” of CDC. My mother, who is prepping, asked my aunt (her sister) if she was concerned about pandemic. My aunt said to my mother, “X and Y work at the CDC. If there were anything to be worried about they would tell us. They haven’t said anything, so there’s nothing to worry about.”
There may be a staggering amount of work and effort going into someone’s preparedness efforts, but if the word doesn’t get out to the general public pretty soon, there’ll be lots of families such as my aunt’s that will be caught with their pants down.
“No, I think you are confusing LPAI with being ‘not fatal to birds’. LPAI is a distinct entity from HPAI, as I explained earlier.
However, HPAI H5N1 can also be not fatal to birds, even asymptomatic, such as what is happening in China with vaccinated chickens. HPAI H5N1 is also frequently not fatal to ducks and geese, particularly wild ones. But the virus being carried by these birds are still dangerous for humans if they catch it. “
Sorry to ask again… is the HPAI/LPAI division done by inoculating chickens with H5N1 found from i.e. healthy seeming geese and looking do the chickens die or not? Or is it done by seeing if a distinct cleavage site is cleavable or not?
I mean, does the LP/HP division really tell only what the virus does to chickens? By determining LP/HP we don’t yet know anything about the pathogenicity to humans? …
Thinlina – at 09:31
Was the 1918 H1N1 Spanish Flu virus lethal to chickens? There have not been any reports of large numbers of chickens dieing off back then. Further, please be aware that this virus, unlike the High Path H5N1, did not have polybasic amino acids at the HA cleavage site.
Doesn’t it make you wonder a bit that the USDA has never released any of the genetic sequences of the H5N1 found in the US, nor have they released any of their detailed test results. What if 70% of the young chicks died within the 10 day test period. By definition, not High Path, but wouldn’t you like to know that?
re: “this outbreak” and “avian flu is here”
Keep in mind we’re looking at fliers primarilly intended to promote specific actions like hand washing and not eating raw dead birds. A flier is not necessarily an authoritative document which will stand up well to the magnifying glass of H5N1 geeks.
If my military experience from the 1980s producing such fliers says anything, it’s that we should consider the potential for inaccuracies and unfortunate phrasing by people who are trained as copywriters and graphic artists; not as MDs. The typical flier in my old portfolio used as source material a page of handwritten notes as a source document, and perhaps a more complete document in technical gibberish which I would quickly highlight, all on subjects with which I was unfamiliar.
I would encourage reading flier text in the same way one reads a newspaper story on the subject: Maybe the copywtiter understands the subject, maybe not. Maybe the final product was reviewed by someone who understands the subject, maybe not. The long PDF linked above, which was written by a team of MDs, and signed by the DOD Asst Sectretary charged with military health issues — It is a nice primary source. The fliers were possibly created by someone who passed a community college writing class and is an expert in Photoshop and Quark Xpress.
Madamspinner at 06:24 -
“Tell the dinosaurs to move over” -
I like the way you said that - we may all become fossils a lot sooner than we’d like if this virus gets the upper hand.
Mamabird – at 09:50 Yes, that’s excactly what I tried to say. Chicken HP/LP doesn’t tell *anything* about human pathogenicity.
Mamabird – at 09:50 Yes, that’s excactly what I tried to say. Chicken HP/LP doesn’t tell *anything* about human pathogenicity.
sn – at 10:03 re: “this outbreak” and “avian flu is here”
Also, are we looking at fliers that are currently being given to DOD personnel, or are they intended for distribution after there has been an outbreak in the US. It would make sense to try and finalize the copy beforehand rather than wait until the day they need to be distributed.
duh, should be a question mark - in the US?
Argyll – at 06:42
“The more I thought about this information not being released to the general public, the more I realized that it the publics overall well-being that is mostly likely being considered.”
I think you are being overly compassionate in your assessment of government motives. Probably right, as regards the majority of those “down the line” who are aware of what is going on but told not to release info to the general public yet so as not to cause a panic, etc. But TPTB that are using this excuse are not concerned with the public’s overall well being but with their own pocketbooks. I am convinced.
A sane and logical action would be to tell the public that there is a significant probability of this flu becoming a pandemic, that there are only vaccines and/or medicine enough for 3% of the population (in the US), and that their best chance for survival is avoidance by sheltering in place. It should tell them that in a manner which is calm and factual, but compelling. It should advise them what the bare minimum of food and water per person should be stored, and tell them to begin now, dividing the list into increments so they can buy 1/4 each week.
The PTB, however, will probably wait to tell the public this until after the holiday buying season is over, so that the “economy” won’t suffer (meaning TPTB’s own personal bank accounts).
My post got lost, again.
Definitely time to use the new forum. :-)
Thinlina – at 09:27
Sorry to ask again… is the HPAI/LPAI division done by inoculating chickens with H5N1 found from i.e. healthy seeming geese and looking do the chickens die or not? Or is it done by seeing if a distinct cleavage site is cleavable or not?
No, it’s ok. Just ask away.
The answer is yes, both. The 75% lethality is the definition used by FAO/OIE for notification purposes, and can also be used as diagnosis. There are, however, ongoing debate about the whether this is a satisfactory definition. I haven’t followed it recently so I don’t know the stage of the process, but there were efforts to change that. This is important because notification results in financial losses to the industry.
That, however, is economics and politics, and not science. The finding of the distinctive cleavage site is considered diagnostic for HP H5N1 for scientific purposes.
LPAI has not been known to cause disease in humans.
Mamabird – at 09:50
Thinlina – at 09:31
Was the 1918 H1N1 Spanish Flu virus lethal to chickens? There have not been any reports of large numbers of chickens dieing off back then. Further, please be aware that this virus, unlike the High Path H5N1, did not have polybasic amino acids at the HA cleavage site.
There are no historical records of avian deaths prior to 1918. Remember that the 1918 virus was H1N1. Current knowledge indicates that the unique cleavage site is only found in H5 and H7 viruses. So we can’t use 1918 as the model, for this question.
Doesn’t it make you wonder a bit that the USDA has never released any of the genetic sequences of the H5N1 found in the US, nor have they released any of their detailed test results. What if 70% of the young chicks died within the 10 day test period. By definition, not High Path, but wouldn’t you like to know that?
I would imagine that the finding of the first sample of HP H5N1 on US soil is so significant that it would be very hard to cover-up. If anything, consider the number of people in the know. Such an important finding would definitely and routinely be verified several times by different researchers and most likely in different labs, because of the serious implications.
With what we know now about H5N1 from different countries, someone would have to be very crazy to try and cover something like this up. Do they think the virus will just disappear on its own? Sooner or later it will spread, and heads will roll then!
Just my 2C. ;-)
AVanarts 11:02
As someone who once produced a killer flier for a military dental clinic on the virtues of brushing one’s teeth, but misspelled “pyorrhea” (a flier which was both approved and distributed), I for one can forgive the delinquent question mark.
anon_22 – at 11:30
“LPAI has not been known to cause disease in humans.”
Oh, really? What about all the reported H9N2 infections in China? Whay do you say to those children? It may not have killed anyone, thus no MSM news about it, but it damn sure caused disease and is now in both birds and humans, and without the novel clevage site. I’m amazed that you are low keying the fact that H1N1 was highly pathogenic to humans, but would not be classified as such under today’s definition.
Finally, what is your take on the reason that the USDA is not sharing any information with the public?
Mamabird – at 13:38
Sorry, I meant LP H5N1, I wasn’t talking about H9N2, it was just a follow through from Thinlina’s questions about LP or HP H5N1.
I don’t have a position about the USDA not sharing any information, cos I don’t know enough about it to have any position.
All I’m saying is that I would think someone trying to hide the discovery of HP H5N1 in the US in the current climate would have to be rather crazy. But then as I said this is just personal opinion.
Or, to put it in another way, sharing of information is always best, but I do not know enough about the background to make a judgement.
anon_22 - 14:40
I’m afraid I think that the description of “rather crazy” might be quite appropriate when referring to a good many people who are in positions of power. That’s one of the things that bothers me.
But, like you - that’s just personal opinion. :)
sn - I too was a graphic artist in teh military during the 80′s and early 90′s.
Did you know another artist named Lamb?
TreasureIslandGal: 16:38
The name isn’t familiar to me. I was an army E5, early 80s, in a joint service environment. I’m glad to hear the field was still uniformed 5 or 10 years after I left — the way the senior NCOs used to tell it, DOD would change their minds every decade about whether graphics should be all military or all civil service. 22 years later, except for perhaps college, I still look at my time in uniform as the most rewarding of my life.
While I am usually on the side that thinks just because you are paranoid does not mean they are not after you - I believe the most likely possiblity is that the brochures that speak of H5N1 already being in the continental US are written that way because the brochures may be primarily designed to be distributed once the pandemic (or bird flu) does reach the US.
If I plan to hand it out when it gets here I write it as if it is here. While posting this brochure on the website does lead to some confusion, I believe the website in question allows bases to purchase (order) the brochure, so the posting of the brochure is meant more for administrative purposes than to carry the actual notice.
<<c3jmp – at 05:05 not concerned about the changes in October - people should be more concerned that those changes are necessary, than that all but one of the Senate and House voted in favor; not surprised it was a Democrat that voted against.
not surprised that military documents have different advice than civilian documents - the military goes into places that civilians do not, and just because someone in the military is in the Staes today, is no indication that they will be tomorrow. with that in mind, i’d be concerned if they didn’t have safe handling procedures in place for poultry last year, especially given the spread in 1918.
i don’t see anything new, or concerning.. >>
wow. This just floors me. I am speechless.
c3jmp – at 01:38
Believe me, you will not be able to read classified military documents online.
Argyll – at 06:42 «The more I thought about this information not being released to the general public, the more I realized that it the publics overall well-being that is mostly likely being considered. For many share the belief that, “no news is good news.” I can only imagine the information that must keep them up at night. The big questions == when do we tell citizens? Razor thin decisions. »
I guess that’s one way to look at. But do you really want someone else taking it upon themselves to decided what you should be told and what should be withheld from you? I sure don’t. I don’t appreciate the fact that I have to spend hundreds of hours ferreting out the truth about the bird flu because my government decides to cover it up and hide it from me. In my opinion, that is not what we hired them to do.
How they deal with us now creates the pattern we will expect when (if) the pandemic hits.
Will we believe they are telling us the truth, enough of the truth to keep us whole, and nothing that is not truth? If the web goes down, or more likely is restricted to certain high priority users, how will we be fact checking and fact scrounging then?
By taking the ‘don’t scare the children’ approach now they are destroying the faith and trust that will be necessary for the public to listen to and respond appropriately to guidance and updates when the time comes. They are undermining their own effectiveness and placing the public at double risk (not adequately prepared - not willing to believe the govt when they will absolutely need to). Basic Risk Communication guidelines and the history of withholding the truth in 1918 give the govt all they need to know, except how to keep profits where and with whom they are today.
Maybe after Christmas. Only XX shopping days til the pandemic warning?
If I trusted that TPTB - either the government or the MSM - to tell me all the truth I need, I wouldn’t have bothered to spend literally hundreds of hours on the internet studying up.
I’d just see what “they” send me in the mail.
Into the Woods and Under the Radar - I agree with you. It’s not that I think all government employees are evil conspirators. But they are human beings subject to human frailty and en masse, the frailties seem to multiply. I am convinced that they are holding off on information to keep the economy going.
sn – at 11:35 <<AVanarts 11:02
As someone who once produced a killer flier for a military dental clinic on the virtues of brushing one’s teeth, but misspelled “pyorrhea” (a flier which was both approved and distributed), I for one can forgive the delinquent question mark. >>
LOL!
Under The Radar – at 17:59
c3jmp – at 01:38
Believe me, you will not be able to read classified military documents online.
Except for that time they posted the floorplan of Airforce 1 on the open web, and the time.. oh never mind.
It happens all the time by accident.
I have one of them framed in my office.
The page at which the documents in quiestion are linked seems conspicuously public to me. It’s a DoD Pandemic Influenza Watchboard for service members and their families. These documents are hardly secret; they are published through this medium for an audience. The Nov. 20 Fact Sheet differentiates between high path and low path H5N1 and says there’s no high path H5N1 in North America, as if to clarify the Oct. 13 trifold on handling birds, which I read to mean that high path H5N1 is indeed here in the U.S. Either they are blatantly inconsistent, or the wording in the trifold is poorly chosen because it is misleading.
anon_22 – at 14:40 “All I’m saying is that I would think someone trying to hide the discovery of HP H5N1 in the US in the current climate would have to be rather crazy. “
Yes, I think so too. But what if we undersize the chicken-LP risk to humans? There are many H5N1 human infections with no known HP (link to poultry deaths) H5N1 contact. Maybe they were LP infections?
Under The Radar – at 17:59 c3jmp – at 01:38 Believe me, you will not be able to read classified military documents online. ________
And the time when they uploaded the recipe how to make an atom bomb in arabic when they needed translation help! ;D ;D OMG!
Under the Radar and Into the Woods,
First, love your handles — they are very clever! You have both brought up valid points. Something my husband told me — as a business owner, he is really nervous, has really stuck with me. If there is some witholding of information it may be to protect citizens and the economy before the pandemic actually “hits.” He said to me there would be nothing worse than a Pre-Pandemic breakdown — of society and the economy. I agreed he had a point — families could conveivably lose income due to lack of work to a crashing economy and not be able to house, clothe and feed their families.
So, from that point of view I can somewhat understand the rationale, although personally I like to have all the facts up front, I am not sure the whole country (or countries in this case) could handle the entire story right now. I am glad they have a web site I can go to and download information. I think that may be why we are getting information in small increments — the public is being “psychologicaly prepared.”
I just wish the information would be front and center on how we can continue healthy habits in the midst of a Pre-Pandemic scenario. So many are clueless and have no idea that they do not possess healthy habits. Until citizens begin to use healthy habits ( including the use of PPE’s — especially masks, proper coughing methods)-- we stand the chance of spreading whatever influenza there is around. I hope we start seeing that information very soon. Why wait until everyone gets sick to tell citizens how to best protect themselves??
A web site, while it is very helpful — may not be the best way to reach people. A good common sense approach to showing us how to practice “healthy habits” is an investment that will never turn bad.
So, to TPTB I would say — RIGHT NOW — give us simple guidelines on protecting ourselves from influenza in public. Across the board media — show us how — send mentors into public wearing masks and gloves, proper cough etiquette ( use billboards if need be!) if that is best. We can help stop the spread right now, why wait?? It is a simple preventative measure.
Argyll.
I’ve said all along that if you’re so sure that the herd will panic, it would be far preferable to panic the herd while the herd is well and not sick or dying. That seems common sense.
I may well understand the rationale, but that doesn’t mean I like it. The country can’t handle the truth? That’s not enough justification for not telling that truth. The notion that the public is being “psychologically prepared” translates in my mind to words like manipulation and lies - and I’m flat out offended at their presumption that I can’t handle the truth and shouldn’t have access to it. Let me decide in what size increments I’ll take my information.
On the other hand…. several members of my family that I have tried to inform about the danger and need to prepare take this stance:
“The government just tries to scare us with terrorist threats and bird flu so we will vote whatever way they want us to.” Also, “I am not going to go out and spend a lot of money preparing - this is just a government trick to make us spend more.”
While I firmly believe TPTB are driven by economics and sometimes other more sinister motives, they may also be aware that too much scary information causes suspicion - as in terrorist plots being discovered just before an election.
How many days until the big announcement we heard about?